XY2552 Fixed Decoy Device

This specification describes a “drone navigation spoofing device” designed to counter unauthorized (“black flight”) drones that pose security risks. The system works by transmitting strong GNSS-like signals embedded with false position information. By competing with genuine satellite signals, it intrudes into a drone’s satellite-navigation solution and thereby enables controlled outcomes such as preventing entry into a protected area, forcing a landing, or driving the drone away. In short, it is an electronic, non-kinetic counter-UAS tool focused on GNSS manipulation rather than physical interception.

From a capability standpoint, the device targets drones that rely on civil satellite navigation modes for positioning and flight. It supports the major GNSS constellations and bands listed in the document: GPS L1 C/A (1575.42 MHz), BeiDou B1I (1561.098 MHz), GLONASS G1 (1602 MHz), and Galileo (1575.42 MHz). The product concept emphasizes all-round, all-weather, long-range protection, including the ability to address multi-drone “swarm” situations. The operator can input spoofing coordinates; the system computes and transmits corresponding multi-constellation signals. It can also transmit spoofing trajectories that induce different drone motions, such as circular patterns or straight-line movement, which is relevant for controlled diversion and containment.

Operational effects are organized into several typical modes described in the manual. “Drive-off” aims to make the drone fly in a specified direction along a straight path. “Defense” aims to keep the drone circling in place so it cannot penetrate a protected zone. “Forced landing / no-fly projection” aims to make the drone’s navigation solution indicate it is within a no-fly area, triggering autonomous landing behavior. A “jamming” function is also described, transmitting navigation interference so the drone cannot obtain a position fix. These options allow an operator to choose between denial of navigation (jamming) and deception/control (spoofing), depending on safety and mission needs.

Key performance parameters in the specification include a stated defense radius of at least 10 km and an intervention time of 2 seconds or less. Coverage is described as full azimuth (360° horizontal) and ±90° vertical, implying hemispherical coverage around the antenna system. The document claims no practical limit on the number of drones that can be spoofed simultaneously. Transmit power is specified as up to 20 W and adjustable, with an adaptable power-amplifier module to tune effective distance. Continuous transmission is specified as 24 hours or more. Total power consumption is listed as no more than 120 W. The device weight is listed at no more than 15 kg, with an IP65-rated enclosure and an operating temperature range of -40°C to +55°C, indicating suitability for outdoor, harsh-environment deployments.

A notable design feature is the integration of a satellite receiver for time synchronization with live satellites, which is important because successful spoofing depends heavily on precise timing alignment. The specification also mentions automatic suppression of same-frequency interference, as well as self-test and status reporting with fault alarms to a command-and-control system. These features point to a product intended not only for manual use but also for integration into broader security platforms.

Interfaces are described in practical detail. Power input is AC 220 V via a connector (socket model Y50DX-1203ZJ with plug Y50DX-1203TK), with pins defined as L, N, and ground. Communications are via an RJ45 Ethernet interface (with an external connector noted as YW1-22F01/YW1-10F01) and are operated through a PC-based “upper-computer” application using UDP; the device port is fixed at 8700 (device IP configurable). RF connectivity uses N-type connectors with an N/SMA-KKF adapter arrangement, with GNSS input and GNSS output defined.

The delivered package list includes the spoofing host chassis, spoofing module, GNSS power amplifier module, GNSS receive antenna, GNSS transmit antenna, and cables (power cable and network cable), plus documentation (default electronic manual). This suggests a field-deployable kit rather than a purely embedded module.

The control software workflow emphasizes correct initialization before transmission. Operators are instructed to verify that GNSS acquisition/positioning is complete and that the internal clock is locked; the document notes this typically takes about 3–5 minutes after power-on. Operators then set transmit power based on distance to the drone, select which constellations to enable (default multiple systems enabled), and execute the chosen operational mode by submitting the relevant command. The interface also provides status blocks for GNSS reception, hardware (clock lock, RF state, satellite counts, CPU temperature), “simulation/transmit” status (transmit state, power, duration, constellation enablement, and gimbal azimuth/elevation if applicable), and logs of protocol exchanges and operations.

Two higher levels of automation are mentioned but marked as not yet available in the software: an “automatic mode” and an “unattended mode.” Both require external detection/tracking systems (Radar, electro-optical tracking, etc.) to feed real-time drone position data to the spoofing device. In automatic mode, the device would adjust azimuth/elevation and transmit power automatically based on target position, while the user would only select the desired effect. In unattended mode, the system would automatically initiate defensive transmission when detection sensors report a drone approaching the protected area. Even though these modes are not currently open, the specification clearly positions the product within a sensor-to-effector integrated counter-UAS architecture.

In terms of application environments, the specification does not limit deployment to a single sector; the combination of IP65 protection, wide temperature tolerance, long-duration operation, and network control supports use at critical infrastructure sites, major event venues, airports and heliports (with careful coordination), government compounds, border and coastal protection points, prisons, power and petrochemical facilities, and temporary emergency-response perimeters. The key constraint is target dependency on GNSS navigation. The document explicitly states effectiveness for civilian drones with navigation modes, implying that drones using alternative guidance methods (high-grade inertial, terrain matching, vision-only navigation, or hardened anti-spoof GNSS) may be less affected or require layered countermeasures.

Regarding “signature news” or landmark usage reports, the provided specification itself does not cite specific deployments, customers, or public incidents tied to this exact product model. What can be responsibly stated in a product report, without inventing claims, is that GNSS spoofing and jamming technologies are widely discussed globally as part of counter-UAS toolsets, particularly after widely reported airport disruptions and critical-infrastructure attacks in recent years. If you want the report to include named case studies, it is best to reference publicly documented counter-drone operations in general terms (e.g., airport and major-event low-altitude security programs) and clearly separate those public cases from claims about this particular device unless you have verifiable sources (official press releases, procurement notices, or accredited news reports) linking them.

Overall, this product is positioned as a long-range, omni-directional GNSS deception and interference platform intended to deny or control drone access to protected airspace. Its differentiators, based on the document, are multi-constellation support, fast engagement time, adjustable power, long endurance, environmental robustness, status monitoring with self-test, and a clear pathway to integration with Radar/EO/frequency-detection systems for automated, around-the-clock operation.